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Abstract 
This article explores gun control and the ethics of hunting and 
suggests that hunting ought not to be permitted, and not 
because of its impact on those animals that are hunted, but 
because of the risk other humans are subjected to as a result of 
some being permitted to own guns for mere preference 
satisfaction. This article examines the nature of freedom, its 
value, and how responsibility for the exercising of that 
freedom ought to be regarded when it involves subjecting 
others to a risk of grave bodily harm. A distinction between 
two kinds of freedom is put forth and it is argued that it would 
be wrong to sacrifice freedoms of intrinsic worth for freedoms 
of instrumental worth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n what follows, I engage in a three-pronged criticism of 
various claims suggesting that owning a gun for the 
purpose of hunting is permissible. The primary thrust of 
this article is the conclusion that because others’ bodily 
health is put at risk by owning a gun, responsibility for that 
risk needs to be properly attributed to the gun owner. 
Furthermore, I suggest that because the risk being 
introduced involves bodily harm of such a grave 
magnitude, that gun owners ought not to be free to 
introduce that risk into others’ lives. 
 
Prior to arriving at this conclusion concerning risk and 
responsibility, I begin with two brief examinations. I focus 
first, on hunting as a means of preventing both undesirable 
populations from occupying an area, as well as 
superabundance in the absence of natural predators. Second, I 
examine the Second Amendment of the United States 
Constitution as a segue into the main purpose of the paper. 
 
WHY HUNTING? 
 
Hunting is seen by many as not only a sport that one might 
derive pleasure from, but also as a necessity in our modern 
society. As urban centers increasingly expand to 
accommodate growing populations, wild animals threaten 
to infringe upon our ability to live our lives as we desire. 
Roads become less safe as we have to travel through the 
natural habitat of deer and other large mammals that can 
cause life-taking vehicle accidents. Our pets and children 
become less safe because of predatory animals living so 
close to homes. Hunting is seen as a necessity to protect us 
and our families and to ensure populations of animals do 
not grow to sizes that magnify the problems mentioned 
I 
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above to no longer be mere nuisances, but to instead, 
genuinely unmanageable situations. Many people argue 
that we must hunt to control populations and to prevent 
undesirable animals from threatening us. 
 
While it is undeniable that some species of animals are 
growing at unsustainable ratesi and that we are subjecting 
ourselves to potentially dangerous animals as we inhabit 
more and more territory, I do not think we can move so 
quickly to suggest that sport hunting is the solution. 
 
First, the reason we have become so burdened by wild 
animals is because of our own actions. We have removed 
undesirable populations of animals from where we would 
like to live and spend leisure time, and thus impacted other 
populations of animals because of a lack of natural 
predators.ii This is often cited as an explanation for the 
dramatic growth in deer populations in North America. 
 
That said, because we ought to be held accountable for the 
problems we now face, we must be more responsible in the 
establishing of solutions. First, the primary cause of 
extinction worldwide is loss of habitat. Peter Wenz argues, 
“people have disrupted areas that animals depend on for 
food, shelter, mating, or spawning.”iii We are responsible for 
the removal of natural predators and the extinction that has 
either happened, or threatens to happen. Because we are 
responsible for this, our solution cannot simply be to kill 
                                                 
i This problem is not one to take lightly. In “Hunting Helps Animal 
Conservation,” in Animal Rights: Opposing Viewpoints, ed. Janelle 
Rohr (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1989), 159, it was suggested that 
since 1900 the total population of whitetail deer has increased from 
approximately 500,000 to more than 16 million. 
ii Peter Wenz, Environmental Ethics Today (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 146-166. 
iii Ibid., 127. 
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more non-human animals. Our solution must not introduce 
further harm, or introduce as little harm as possible, to the 
animals we have already negatively impacted. 
 
The second leading cause of extinction is, in fact, hunting.iv 
As a result of us creating the problems we now face, we 
have a responsibility to ensure we do not further 
disadvantage non-human animal populations with our 
proposed solutions. 
 
To regard the killing of more non-human animals as the 
solution to our difficulty is to ignore the fact that we are the 
reason we are currently facing a problem. Surely we could 
justify almost any course of action if we were permitted to 
be the cause of such dire predicaments in the first place. In 
an analogous manner, it is easy to justify striking someone 
in self-defense after having thrown one’s own face into his 
or her fist. Simply identifying a problem is an insufficient 
justification to hunt. We must look at the impact of hunting, 
as well as at what precipitated the problem in the first 
place. If we find we are the cause of what threatens us, this 
alters, quite significantly I think, what constitutes a 
reasonable solution to the problem. 
 
Aside from taking responsibility for being the cause of the 
problem that now requires a solution, it has been suggested 
that 
 
[p]romoting hunting to maintain land-health is like 
promoting amateur surgery for human health.  
People sometimes require surgery, just as 
ecosystems sometimes require the culling of 
species. But human health would not generally 
improve if we made a sport of surgery. Amateur 
                                                 
iv Ibid. 
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surgeons would remove the wrong tissues, tie up 
loose ends badly, cause infections, and leave bad 
scars. Amateur hunters tend to do analogous 
damage to ecosystems.v 
 
Therefore, sport hunting ought not to be viewed as a 
solution to the problems we face with superabundance or 
undesirable populations because (i) we are responsible for 
most problems we currently face and thus, must minimize 
the harm we introduce into the world; and (ii) even if this 
introduction of harm could be justified, it would be 
imprudent to allow sport hunting on the grounds that it 
provides us with social utility because we could best serve 
that purpose through allowing professionals to relocate or 
cull animal populations. 
 
THE SECOND AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 
 
Second, because the right to bear arms is built into the 
fabric of the U.S. political system through the Second 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, it is often 
argued that to prohibit one from owning and using guns for 
the purposes of hunting would be unconstitutional, or at 
least a violation of some sort of fundamental right. 
 
That said, we do frequently set limits on the freedoms 
established by the Constitution.  The First Amendment is 
regularly limited for the purpose of the greater social good. 
We of course, criticize such restrictions on free speech 
when, for example, these restrictions are designed to 
suppress political dissent or are designed solely or wholly 
to be paternalistic in nature. 
                                                 
v Ibid., 154. 
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However, we do accept, and often without much resistance, 
restrictions on the First Amendment when others’ well-
being is at stake. To use a clichéd example, we cannot enter 
a crowded theatre and shout “fire.” We accept this 
limitation on our freedom because we realize that others’ 
rights to well-being can often serve as trumps against more 
trivial rights such as the ability to make a false, and 
potentially dangerous utterance, in public. Dworkin 
acknowledges this claim when he suggests  
 
a right against the Government need not go so far as 
to say that the State is never justified in overriding 
that right. He might say, for example, that although 
citizens have a right to free speech, the Government 
may override that right when necessary to protect 
the rights of others, or to prevent a catastrophe, or 
even to obtain a clear and major public benefit.vi 
 
It might be better to not limit any freedoms at all, but in 
these instances there appears to be trade-offs, and ones we 
are willing to accept. Thomson has suggested that it “might 
be said that we do violate one or more of your rights […] 
but that our act, though wrongful, is excusable.”vii It would 
be inconsistent to suggest that the rights guaranteed by one 
Amendment are so flexible that they can be overridden by 
concerns of social utility, while others are absolute and 
must, under no circumstance, be denied. 
 
Thus, it appears that arguments concerned about the 
Second Amendment ignore the fact that we have an 
                                                 
vi Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1977), 191. 
vii Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights, Restitution, & Risk: Essays in Moral 
Theory (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1986), 52. 
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established precedence of overriding Constitutional 
guarantees when the good of many are at stake. 
 
ON RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Thomson suggests that “it seems to [her] we do well to 
agree that rights are not all absolute: There are rights which 
can be infringed without being violated.”viii In the 
remainder of this paper I advance this claim further, and 
suggest that the right to bear arms for the purpose of 
hunting is a right that can and should be infringed upon 
because of the risk it introduces into the lives of others. 
 
In what follows, I shift the focus away from non-human 
animal rights to instead, the risk undertaken on behalf of 
others when one owns a gun for the purpose of hunting. In 
many respects, the remainder of this paper is about 
freedom, its value, and how responsibility for the 
exercising of that freedom ought to be regarded when it 
involves subjecting others to a risk of grave bodily harm. 
 
Those who suggest that freedom is the embodiment of 
advantage—who ignore other aspects associated with well-
being—might be said to be guilty of fetishizing freedom—
of taking freedom to be the embodiment of advantage. 
After all, any conception of the morality of our actions or 
of justice must take into account the full picture. To fail to 
move beyond freedom as a good is too simplistic. This 
failure ignores both other aspects that comprise our well-
being, as well as what freedom does for us. I posit that 
freedom is more often than not good because of the sorts of 
things it permits us to do, and only in very rare 
circumstances is it good in and of itself. 
 
                                                 
viii Ibid., 54. 
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Arneson has suggested that to postulate that  
 
freedom is of intrinsic moral importance and should 
sometimes be sought even at the expense of well-
being is fetishistic, in much the same way that 
concentrating on means to freedom as though it 
were valuable in itself it thoughts by Sen to be 
fetishistic.ix 
 
I take there to be at least two distinct kinds of freedom. The 
first are freedoms that can be seen to be intrinsically good. 
These types of freedoms are few and far between. These 
freedoms can be said to be intrinsically good because they 
are fertile—they promote even more (quantity), greater 
forms of freedom (quality).x These freedoms are the kinds 
of freedoms that without, one would suffer corrosive 
disadvantage—one would be unable to pursue other 
valuable states of being. I take something like the freedom 
of bodily health—to be free from violent assault—to be a 
paradigmatic example of a freedom that is intrinsically 
good. Even if freedom from violent assault did not increase 
                                                 
ix Richard Arneson, “‘Good Enough’ is not Good Enough,” in 
Capabilities Equality: Basic Issues and Problems, edited by Alexander 
Kauffman (New York: Routledge, 2005), 34. 
x I have spoken about a similar subject in a different context before in 
C. A. Riddle, “Raking Capabilities,” in Discussing Capabilities, 
Emotions and Values: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, edited by Koji 
Nakatogawa, and Lidia de Tienda Palop (Sapporo: Key Word, 2015); 
C. A. Riddle, Disability and Justice: The Capabilities Approach in 
Practice (Lanham: Lexington Books / Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 
81-84; C. A. Riddle, “Well-Being and the Capability of Health,” Topoi 
32, no. 2 (2013): 157-159. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9167-
x; and C. A. Riddle, “Responsibility and Foundational Material 
Conditions,” The American Journal of Bioethics 11, no. 7 (2011): 53-
55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2011.568578 
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one’s ability to secure other valuable freedoms or states of 
being, it would still be something that possesses worth. 
 
Conversely, most freedoms tend to be only instrumentally 
good. Most freedoms involve preference satisfaction and 
are not necessarily good in and of themselves. The freedom 
of play tends to be an instrumental freedom. It is good 
because it allows individuals to simply satisfy the 
preferences they have. Certainly some basic level of leisure 
is necessarily, but the vast array of freedom we possess to 
decide what we do with our leisure time is not necessarily 
an intrinsic good. This freedom is instrumentally good 
because it allows us to satisfy preferences we have. 
 
The important conclusion to draw from this distinction for 
the purposes of this argument is that we should never 
permit freedoms of the second variety—those freedoms 
that result in mere preference satisfaction—to come at the 
cost of the first type of freedoms—those freedoms that 
possess intrinsic worth. 
  
I suggest that mere preference satisfaction should take a 
back seat to the more robust forms of freedom that can be 
seen as being good in and of themselves. To be clear, in 
what follows, I intend to demonstrate that the freedom to 
own a gun for the purposes of hunting is a freedom that 
possesses only instrumental worth, and ought to be 
restricted to secure the freedom of bodily health—a 
freedom with intrinsic worth. In other words, it is an 
insufficient justification for hunting to state that someone 
would be happy, or happier, if permitted to hunt. Satisfying 
preferences in this context by granting the freedom to own 
a gun comes at the cost of others’ bodily health—a freedom 
with intrinsic worth. 
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If the argument appears too abstract thus far, let me begin 
to contextualize it. I suspect we tend to agree with my 
above claims in many contexts. Take the freedom to 
smoke for example. Individuals should be free to do as 
they wish, but we begin to limit this freedom once it 
begins to infringe upon others’. Now that we are aware of 
the dangers of second-hand smoke, we, in many public 
places throughout the United States, deny smokers the 
freedom to smoke. We deny them this right both for 
paternalistic reasons, but more of concern for this paper, 
because it puts others at risk. We take the right to be free 
from bodily injury (to not be forced to suffer from second-
hand smoke) to be far more important than the right of an 
individual to smoke wherever they wish. Moreover, we 
take it to be the case that any restaurant, for example, that 
permits smoking, is acting irresponsibly and subjecting 
employees and customers to unnecessary risk. Importantly, 
we think both the smoker as well as the establishment 
permitting the smoking ought to be held responsible for the 
risk one is subjected to as a result of their exercising the 
freedom to smoke. 
 
I will now offer another analogy to further reinforce this 
claim. Imagine the following scenario. You enter a 
restaurant one evening and are told that there are two and 
only two dishes being offered that night. You can order 
option A, an option that you would find satisfying. To 
prepare option A, the waiting staff would simply go back 
to the kitchen, place the order, and pick it up to deliver to 
your table. However, you could also order option B. To 
procure the ingredients for option B, the waiting staff must 
exit the rear of the restaurant and dive into hungry shark 
infested water, only to be put further at risk by angry 
poachers attempting to hunt the shark for fin soup. If you 
are honest with yourself, while option A would make you 
happy and you would enjoy your meal, it is the case that 
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you would be much happier with option B. Call this 
scenario, the case of the endangered waiter. 
 
I hope that this example demonstrates that even though 
option B would make you happier, it would be wrong to 
proceed and order B, thereby endangering the waiting staff, 
simply to satisfy your mere preferences. After all, there is a 
perfectly good, albeit slightly less satisfying option, that 
does not put anyone at grave risk. Anyone who insisted on 
ordering B would be reckless and selfish. 
 
Just as in the smoking example above, I suspect that not 
only should we call into question your decision to order B 
if you chose to do so, but that we should also be critical of 
the restaurant that provided you with the option to endanger 
others in the first place. In other words, not only would it 
be wrong for you to order B to satisfy your preferences and 
consequently endanger the waiting staff, but it would be 
wrong for the restaurant to permit you to be in such a 
position to willingly endanger another. 
 
I take hunting to be similar to the case of the endangered 
waiter. Certainly there are other leisure activities one 
would be free to pursue if hunting were forbidden. While 
it may very well be the case that one would derive less 
satisfaction from the available alternatives, others would 
not be subjected to the potential of violent assault as a 
result of your chosen leisure activity. As a result of 
owning a gun for the purposes of hunting, one is leaving 
open the option of that gun being stolen and used by 
another to harm someone. 
 
Another example of similar reasoning can be found in 
Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, when he states: 
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Suppose then that I enjoy swinging a baseball bat. It 
happens that in front of the only place to swing it 
stands a cow. Swinging the bat unfortunately would 
involve smashing the cow’s head. But I wouldn’t 
get fun from doing that; the pleasure comes from 
exercising my muscles, swinging well, and so on. 
It’s unfortunate that as a side effect (not a means) of 
doing this, the animal’s skull gets smashed. To be 
sure, I could forego swinging the bat, and instead 
bend down and touch my toes or do some other 
exercise. But this wouldn’t be an enjoyable as 
swinging the bat; I won’t get as much fun, pleasure, 
or delight out of it.xi 
 
Although the harmed agent in Nozick’s example is a non-
human animal, I suspect we feel strongly that to make the 
choice to swing the bat rather than one of the alternatives 
would be wrong. Even when modified, the force of the 
example remains: “Suppose that it is not merely a question 
of foregoing today’s special pleasure of bat swinging; 
suppose that each day the same situation arises with a 
different example”xii. 
 
However, the case of the endangered waiter is different 
than hunting for numerous reasons as well. First, the 
waiter has voluntarily subjected him or herself to the risk 
associated with you potentially ordering option B. In 
many respects, the waiter might be said to bear at least 
partial responsibility for any harm that befalls him or her 
because of the choices he or she has made. Conversely, 
individuals who are subjected to violent assault from 
                                                 
xi Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York, Basic Books, 
1974), 37. 
xii Ibid. 
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stolen firearms have not agreed to be subjected to this 
risk—they are innocent. 
 
That said, I don’t think this difference negatively impacts 
the force of the example, and on the contrary, I suspect it 
supports it. Even if the waiter were not especially risk 
aversive and lacked the foresight to realize the potential 
harm he or she could have tacitly agreed to, we would still 
think it would be wrong for the restaurant to prey on this 
fact and permit customers to endanger the waiting staff. 
Moreover, even if he or she should be held partly 
responsible for any harm that could come his or her way, I 
suspect we still arrive at the conclusion that it would be 
wrong to choose option B when there was an alternative 
that would still be satisfactory and not subject anyone to the 
possibility of death or serious bodily harm. 
 
Second, the purpose of a restaurant is not to protect waiting 
staff from harm, but is instead, to provide satisfactory 
meals to customers. It may very well be the case that 
restaurants ought not subject their staff to preventable 
harm, but this is a side constraint on the realization of 
serving food and turning a profit. Government’s however, 
often implement policy with the sole or primary purpose of 
protecting citizens from harm. We take the government to 
be responsible for our well-being, and if we are permitted 
to be subjected to avoidable harm, we question the 
institutional arrangements that allowed this harm to be 
introduced.  In this sense, the case of the endangered waiter 
might seem too distinct. 
 
Yet again however, I suspect this difference supports the 
prohibition of owning a gun for hunting more than it 
undermines the argument. Perhaps obviously, because one 
of the main purposes of the Government is to protect its 
citizens, it should have an even stronger responsibility than 
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the restaurant to avoid the introduction of harm. If it is 
wrong for a restaurant to permit a choice that introduces 
harm, it should be considered even more egregious for a 
State to do so. 
 
In short, it is impermissible to make a choice or choices to 
satisfy mere preferences that subject other people to grave 
bodily injury. Furthermore, it is impermissible for those in 
a position to regulate these sorts of choices to permit one 
to voluntarily endanger another. In the context of gun 
control and the ethics of hunting, it is impermissible to 
choose to hunt because of the potential harm that could be 
introduced to others, and it is also impermissible for the 
Government to permit people to make the choice to hunt 
and thereby introduce the possibility of harm to other, 
innocent,xiii people. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Therefore, what I have suggested is that hunting ought not 
to be permitted, and not because of its impact on those 
animals that are hunted, but because of the risk other 
humans are subjected to as a result of some being permitted 
to own guns for mere preference satisfaction. What matters 
                                                 
xiii I place emphasis on “innocent” here because we do regularly engage 
in activity to satisfy preferences that subject others to risk. If we take 
the choice to drive an automobile to be one that satisfies mere 
preferences, we can acknowledge that such a choice subjects many 
other people to the potential of harm. That said, the choices to hunt or 
to bear arms are relatively unique choices because of the potential for 
bystanders to be harmed.  Most automobile accidents involve injury to 
other automobile operators. Very few accidents involve harm befalling 
pedestrians. In this sense, those who are subjected to the risk associated 
with being in an automobile are only those who have agreed to be 
placed at risk. Most people harmed by guns from hunters are not 
hunters, but are instead, people who have not agreed to the potential for 
harm that could befall them as a result of another owning a gun. 
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most is human flourishing, and desire satisfaction ought to 
be relegated to a secondary goal.xiv In conclusion, we 
should not permit the owning of guns for the purpose of 
hunting because it introduces unnecessary harm into the 
lives of others.  
                                                 
xiv Richard J. Arneson, “Human Flourishing Versus Desire 
Satisfaction,” Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 16, no. 1 
(1999): 142. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511570704.006 
